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In this work, we present a model based on a competitive dynamics that intends to imitate the
processes leading to some characteristics of the geopolitical division. The model departs from very
simple principles of geopolitical theory and geometrical considerations, but succeeds to explain
general features related to the actual process. At the same time, we will propose an evolutionary
explanation to the fact that most capitals (in Eurasia) are located far from the borders or coasts
and, in many cases, close to the barycenter of the respective countries.
PACS numbers:
INTRODUCTION
The combination of both a suitable theory and empiri-
cal data can render macro historical predictions possible.
This is one of the statement enounced by R. Collins in
[1], where he accounts for a successful prediction of the
breakup of the Soviet Union. The suitable theory that
frames his model [2] is a geopolitical theory for the power
of the states. The history of geopolitical theory started
in Germany at the beginning of the 20th century with the
works by Weber [3] on the development of the state. But
it was not until the 70’s, after many years of declining
interest on the subject, that the studies on this area of
knowledge flourished [4]. Among all the processes stud-
ied by geopolitical history, the formation of the modern
states system emerges as one of the most relevant, involv-
ing feedback processes between the economy, the society
and the politics.
The geopolitical configuration of the continents and its
evolution was a determinant factor on the economic suc-
cess of several areas of the world. At the same time it
was critical in sealing the future political regimes of the
nations. As complex as the spatial evolution of states
might be, Collins [2] proposed a simple theoretical model
to deal with the main aspects involved in the process
of expansion and contraction of the territorial power of
sates. The model is based on five principles that will be
summarized in the following paragraph. These princi-
ples describe the factors that promote the expansion or
the collapse of a nation. On one side, the expansion of
states is favored by the geographical size and availability
of resources and by geopositional advantages, e.g. coun-
tries with fewer enemies expand at the expenses of other
countries with more enemies on the borders. However,
on the other side, a strain of resources may arise as a re-
sult of overextension, leading to the disintegration of the
state. In the same model Collins assumes that states in
the middle of a geographical region tend to fragment into
smaller unities over time. Finally, the model affirms that
some cumulative processes give place to long term sim-
plification, with massive wars between a few contenders.
We can give an example of the processes foreseen by these
principles. During historical periods previous to the tech-
nological explosion derived from the industrial revolution
the states increased their power through conquest and ex-
pansion. But this process entailed an increment in the
costs of administration and military defense. Therefore,
whereas the seek for power promoted the expansion, the
increment in size and in administrative duties imposed
critical constrains. At the initial stages of expansion the
increments in the wealth of a successful state exceeded
the incremental costs of defending the additional new ter-
ritory. However, when borders reached a critical distance
from the center of power those costs rose faster than the
benefits. As the survival of a polity depended on its mil-
itary power to neutralize the constant threat posed by
contiguous states, the protection of the borders was cru-
cial [5].
In [6] the author analyzes the interplay between the
evolution of the geopolitical structure of Europe towards
a system of competing states and the social develop-
ment. This competing structure promoted the creation
of a pluralistic environment that succeeded to constrain
the power of the ruling classes, as well as the power of
the states on the individuals, helping to promote institu-
tions and legal systems that ultimately provided greater
freedom than did monolithic empires. Jones affirms that
the ultimate configuration of the state system in Europe
can not respond to mere geometric aspects and funds his
affirmation on the analysis of a collection of complex and
interconnected facts that should have influenced on the
whole geopolitical process. These conclusions seem to
contradict the ideas of Collins, whose model is mainly
based on geometrical considerations. The goal of this
work is to show that although geometry can not account
for the whole geopolitical process, it does impose some
constrains with important effects on the geopolitical di-
vision process. When the geometry of a given polity is
closely related to other indicators such as the military
power and the availability of resources some basic as-
pects of the process of political division can be derived
from a model solely based on topological principles.
2This task was partially accounted by Artzrouni and
Komlos [7], where they analyzed the spatial evolution of
the European state system throughout a period extend-
ing roughly from A.D. 500 to A.D. 1800. Following this
previous work, we generalize the model to include some
additional aspects, such as the location of the center of
power controlling each of the states and the analysis not
only the final configuration but of the temporal evolution
towards the steady state.
THE MODEL
The model presented here is associated to a previous
work by Artzrouni and Komlos [7], where the authors
introduced a spatial predatory model to trace the evo-
lution of the political borders in Europe, from 500 A.D.
to 1800 A.D. The dynamics of the model is based on the
fact that any political unit has a natural tendency to ex-
pand by conquering neighboring areas. A first simplistic
assumption is that its perspective of success or failure in
combat will depend on its military power. Following the
principles stated in [2] the present model considers that
the military power increases with the size of a state but
decreases as a result of the over-extension of the border-
line and the increment of the distance between the cen-
ter of power and the borders. Though the present model
represents an oversimplification of the real historical pro-
cess still captures the most essential features. Among the
neglected features we can mention the evolution of mil-
itary technology, as well as the inhomogeneities in the
distribution of the population and other economic indi-
cators. In this version of the model we will consider the
expansion or collapse by annexation but we will neglect
the segregation of big polities into smaller units. Each
country struggles for its survival by combating its neigh-
bouring rivals. During the initial stages of the evolu-
tion this process leads the successful countries to expand
and the defeated states to shrink and disappear. The
gains in wealth and power associated to the expansion
exceed the incremental costs of defending the annexed
territory. Some defeated countries eventually disappear
as a continuous loss of territories undermines their mil-
itary power and can not withstand further attacks from
their opponents. At a later stage the length of the ex-
panding borders increase as well as their distances to the
center increase, making the costs to protect them go be-
yond the benefits of expansion. At this point, the states
face the dilemma of maintaining or stopping an expansive
process involving costs that become increasingly difficult
to overcome.
Based on the previous considerations, Artzrouni and
Komlos [7] define the military power of a state, P , as a
quantity depending on the geometry of each state. It is
expressed as a function of two variables.: the area A and
perimeter F of a country. The states are located on top
of a square lattice. The area A is simply the number of
nodes of the grid occupied by the country, whereas the
perimeter is the number of bordering nodes. In turn,
P (A,M) is defined as
P (A,M) =
A
δ + exp(γF + β)
, (1)
where δ, β, and γ are positive parameters.
One of the modifications introduced in the present
work is the addition of fixed centers of power or capi-
tals with a crucial role on the dynamics of the system.
The military power P will depend on the area A and on
a quantity M that measures the distance between the
frontier points and the center of power. Physically, this
quantity is associated to a power of the moment of inertia
of the border of a country, relative to its capital.
Mk =
∑
b∈Ωk
[(ib − ick)2 + (jb − jck)2]α, (2)
where Ωk is the border of the country k, ib and jb are
the coordinates of a border node b and ick and jck the
coordinates of the capital. In the previous model two
different geomorphological aspects have been considered:
The first one is the existence of natural barriers due to
topological aspects of the terrain, that only inhibit the
interaction between adjacent nodes. The second one is
the existence of coasts, generally more easy to defend.
We will account only for the effect of the coastal borders
on M through a weighting factor κ < 1. Thus, Eq.(2)
results in
Mk =
∑
b∈Ω1
k
[(ib − ick)2 + (jb − jck)2]α +
∑
b∈Ω2
k
{κ[(ib − ick)2 + (jb − jck)2]}α, (3)
where Ω1 takes into account the inland border and Ω2
the coastal border nodes. P (A,M) is defined as
P (A,M) =
A
exp(γM)
. (4)
According to the previous discussion, we want the mili-
tary power to decide the outcome of a combat, though we
are interested in preserving a certain degree of stochas-
ticity as well. Therefore, we follow the prescription pro-
posed in [7]. After measuring the P values of the two
confronting countries we call Ph and Pl the higher and
lower P values respectively. This identification is irrel-
evant in case of equality and can be randomly done as
shown later. Next we assign the victory to the country
with the higher military power with a probability
φh = 1− 0.5 exp(−k(Ph/Pl − 1)),
where k is the parameter that tunes the deterministic
character of the dynamics. The higher k is the higher the
3possibility of the strongest country to win will be. The
weakest country wins with a probability φl = 1− φh. In
case of equality the probabilities are φl = φh = 0.5. The
same is true when k = 0, and the systems evolves in a
random way.
The analysis of Eqs. (1) and (4) clarifies the idea that
P is a quantity that contains information about the mili-
tary power of a state and about how efficiently this power
can be used. The area A favors the economic power and
population size. But beyond a certain threshold level of
spatial expansion the military power becomes less effec-
tive since more resources are needed for the defense of
the enlarged frontier. On one hand P is a monotonic in-
creasing function of A, indicating that a greater area rep-
resents a potentially higher power. On the other hand,
a bigger area can inhibit the efficient exertion of that
power by effects of the stateťs geometry. This fact is
taken into account in the dependence of P on F or M .
As an example, we will consider a state represented by
n2 territorial unities. In two extreme situations the state
can be a n×n square or a n2×1 rectangle. Though both
state have the same area, the rate perimeter - surface is
lower for the square state, consequently, according to Eq.
((1)) its military power is higher. A similar conclusion
can be derived when considering Eq. (4). According to
Steiner theorem, the moment of inertia of a plane figure
is minimum when it is calculated about an axis located
at the center of mass. Therefore, among all the states
with identical shape, the one with its capital being the
closest to the center of mass will present the lowest value
of M . A possible observation to the situation described
above is the fact that borders closer to the center of power
should be easier to protect that those far away. At the
same time, a wiser military strategy will tend to focus
the defense of the country on the borders but without ne-
glecting the capital. To consider this facts we introduce a
further modification of Eq. (4), by including a local term
that accounts for the relative distance between the cap-
ital and the border points involved in a specific conflict,
i.e. the points at the border with the eventual opponent
country. The military power presents then a global term
plus a local factor associated with the conflictive border.
We redefine P as
P (A,M) =
A
exp(γMMl)
. (5)
The calculation of Ml is analogous to that of M but re-
stricted to the border under conflict, i.e. Ω1 and Ω2 in
Eq.(3) refer only to the partial border.
As we will show later, the dynamics of this system can
be associated to a cluster growth process. Although there
is a vast literature on this area [8–13] and some of these
works might show some common features with the one
described in this work, the present model includes some
unique features closely related to the particular problem
here analyzed. In the following section we discuss the
results obtained in each case
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FIG. 1: Ns vs. time for a random dynamics.
Throughout all the simulations we have maintained the
same initial condition. At the beginning the system is
composed by 400 states, each one being a square compris-
ing 3 × 3 surface unities with the capital located at the
barycenter. The whole system is a square lattice of 60×60
surface unities. During the first stages of the simulation,
the dynamics of the system is purely random, until some
differences among the shapes of the states arise, playing
a defining role in the further evolution of the system. In
order to get a correct interpretation of our results, we
analyze first the behaviour of a system driven by a ran-
dom dynamics throughout the whole simulation. This
can be very easily achieved by considering that the out-
come of a fight is uncorrelated to the military power of
the confronting countries. In this case the winner is ran-
domly chosen. Figure 1 summarizes the main findings:
the dynamics of the model drives the system to the con-
formation of a unique big country having conquered all
the available territory. The collapse of smallest countries
produces an exponential decay in the number of survival
countries Ns, with a slowing down when the number of
remaining countries is around 10. At this point the dis-
appearance of countries takes much longer. Finally, the
system converges to its only steady state.
This trivial stochastic evolution turns much more in-
teresting when, as proposed in the model, it is the value
P what defines the victorious country. According to what
was discussed before, we expect the states displaying val-
ues of P monotonically related to their sizes at the be-
ginning. After a transient letting to the disappearing of
4the majority of the countries and the conformation of a
bunch of powerful sates, the effect of the critical size must
be apparent. At this point the increasing value of F or
M dominates the evolution of the states, making their P
values to decrease in case of overextension. The previous
FIG. 2: P (r, γ) for the case associated to Eq.(1), α = β = 1
.
affirmations can be supported by analytical results. Con-
sidering Eqs. (1) and (4), we can state that the optimal
shape adopted by any state is the circular one. In our
analysis, and only for simplicity, we will consider the oc-
tagonal shape. Furthermore, if the location of the capital
is taken into account, P is maximized when the former is
located on the center of mass of the corresponding state.
We define r as the radius of the circle circumscribing the
octagon. As discussed before, an expanding state will
increase its military power until a critical value of r is at-
tained. At this point the effects of the overextension will
start to be noticeable. We can estimate the maximum
attainable value of P at this critical radius rc.
If we analyze the Eq.(1) considering that a state ex-
pands preserving an octogonal shape and a centered cap-
ital, we can find an approximate value of rc, the point
when the maximum military power is achieved. We note
that the quantities A, F and P can be written now in
terms of r.
A(r) = 2(2 sin(pi/8)r)2(1 +
√
2)
F (r) = 16 sin(pi/8)r (6)
P (r) =
A(r)
(α+ exp(γP (r) + β)
Figure 2 shows the value of P (r) according to the ex-
pression in Eq. (6) in the (r, γ) plane . The existence
of critical radius rc is evident. Deriving the last of Eqs.
(6) with respect to r let us find rc, getting the following
expression
eβ+16rcγ sin(pi/8)(8rcγ sin(pi/8)− 1)− α = 0 (7)
with a solution for rc in terms of Lambert’s W function,
rc =
2 +W [2α exp(−2− β)]
16 sin(pi/8)γ
(8)
The former expression shows us that the critical radius
is inversely proportional to γ. If we consider that the
mean size of the countries is inversely proportional to
the square of the radius, we get the following relation:
Ns ∝ γ2. This is precisely what we get when plotting
the numerical data on the (Ns, γ) plane and we fit them
with a parabola, as shown in Fig. 3. When we take the
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FIG. 3: Ns vs. γ for the case associated to Eq.(1), α = β =
1. The dashed line corresponds to fitting the data with a
parabola
.
location of the capital into account we get the following
expressions:
A(r) = 2(2 sin(pi/8)r)2(1 +
√
2)
M(r) = 2(2 +
√
2) sin(pi/8)r2α+1 (9)
B(r) =
A(r)
exp(γM(r))
In this case the critical radius is inversely proportional
to γ1/(2α+1), therefore Ns ∝ γ 22α+1 . Fig. 4 shows an
example of the fitting of numerical data when α = 1.
The fitting shows us that Ns ∝ γ 23
This analysis is not applicable to Eq. (5) because it
involves not only the geometry of the analyzed state, but
also that of its neighbours as well as local considerations.
All the data on Figs. 6 and 10 correspond to averages
over 1000 realizations for each point. The number of sur-
viving states Ns reaches a stationary value, maintained
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FIG. 4: Ns vs. γ for the case associated to Eq.(4), α = 1.
The scales are logarithmic. The dotted line has a slope equal
to 2/3
.
over at least 50000 time steps, ten times longer that the
time it takes the system to reach the steady value. Al-
though the number of surviving states remains constant,
the system is not frozen. We can observe to changes
in the shapes and sizes of these surviving countries due
to persisting combats. Nevertheless, these fights do not
change significatively the conformed map. These results
let us confirm that the system evolves, with some coun-
tries expanding at cost of the collapse of others, until a
metastable situation is achieved.
At his point the analysis of the model described by
Eq. (1) is almost through except for the study of the
shape and size distribution of the surviving countries. To
statistically analyze the geometry of the surviving coun-
tries we measure how far from a circle or octagon their
shapes are. We consider a quantity ρ herewith defined.
First we measure the distance di,0 between each point i
on the borderline of the country and its center of mass.
Then we calculate ρ as the ratio between the variance of
this distances and the area of the country, A. If a coun-
try is circular, this quantity is equal to cero, while it is
≈ 0.00112 for an octagon. The expression for ρ is then
ρ =
1
A
(
1
NΩ
∑
i∈Ω
(di,0)
2 − ( 1
NΩ
∑
i∈Ω
di,0)
2
)
(10)
In Fig. 5 we plot ρ versus the number of surviving
states, Ns. The filled dots correspond to the present
case. We observe the sharp transition as the number of
surviving countries grows from 1 to 3 . The lower value,
ρ ≈ 4×103 corresponds to a unique squared country lim-
ited by the shape and size of the lattice. The value of ρ
then stabilizes around 5×102. As a reference, a rectangu-
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FIG. 5: ρ vs. Ns, the number of surviving countries. Filled
dots: Eq.(1), Empty dots: Eq.(4). α = β = 1.
lar, almost 1-dimensional country of the same size when
γ = 0.1 would have ρ ≈ 10. The variation in size, whose
mean value is associated to the mean number of surviv-
ing states depicted in Fig. 3, is around 50% when the
number of surviving countries is over 5, then it decreases
abruptly to zero. The introduction of fixed capitals let us
add to the previous analysis the study of their locations
and of the centrality of the respective countries. One of
the aspects we wanted to analyze by means of the mod-
ification introduced to the original model was precisely
where the capitals of the surviving countries are located.
Figure 5 also shows the behaviour of ρ in this case, plot-
ted with empty dots. The most evident fact is that the
values are lower than in the previous case, indicating that
the countries adopt a more symmetric and circular shape.
The results do not differ too much if we consider either
Eq. (4) or Eq. (5).
When considering the location of the capital, not only
we can measure ρ but we can calculate the distance be-
tween the center of mass and the capital. we choose
the mean radius of the country to compare the previ-
ous distance with a characteristic length. We define
δc0 = dc,0/rm, where dc,0 is the distance between the
capital and the center of mass and rm is the mean ra-
dius.
Figures 6 and 7 show the distribution of δc0 for dif-
ferent values of α and γ for the cases described by Eqs.
(4) and (5) respectively. In this case there is an evident
difference in the behaviour of the system. The values of
α and γ were adjusted to get a final configuration with
the same number of surviving countries in each case. We
can observe that if we consider local aspect related to the
military power and the cost of defending the borders we
get capitals located closer to the center of mass of the
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FIG. 6: Distribution of δc0 for different pairs of values α and
γ with < Ns >= 10. This is the case associated to Eq.(4).
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FIG. 7: Distribution of δc0 for different pairs of values α and
γ with < Ns >= 10. This is the case associated to Eq.(5).
states.
To provide a more graphical example of the results we
present the outcome of three single realizations in Fig
8, together with a representation of the time evolution
of the sizes of the surviving countries. Each realization
corresponds to a different choice for P . The group (a)
corresponds to the model that does not take into account
the location of capitals, Eq. (1), while (b) and (c) differ
in that the last one reflects the state of a system where
P is affected by local contributions, Eq. (5)and (b) cor-
responds to Eq. (4). When we observe the temporal
evolution of the size of the surviving countries the dif-
ferences are rather evident. The curves related to model
associated to Eq. (1) present fluctuations of great ampli-
tude. This behaviour reflects in the distribution of sizes
Time
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FIG. 8: Maps and size evolution of surviving countries for
three different cases
of the states than can be observed in the map showing an
instantaneous picture of the system. At a given moment
some countries can be six times bigger than others. If
fluctuations are strong enough they can lead the system
to a trivial state. On the other hand, groups (b) and
(c) show a more steady behaviour. After a transient, the
size of the countries stabilizes suffering only very small
fluctuations. At the same time the distribution of sizes is
more even. Groups (b) and (c) differ en that the effect of
local considerations is the centralization of the capitals,
displayed with stars on the map. This effect was already
discussed in Fig.7.
CONCLUSIONS
Supported by the fact that the historical evolution of
geopolitics is a complex process involving a huge variety
of causes and effect, the conception of simple models ex-
plaining general aspects has been neglected. This fact
is the main motivation behind the present work. It is
not the intention of this model to provide an accurate
and complete description of the process that shaped the
present political division of the world. On the contrary,
its more modest goal is to show that some general fea-
tures can be explained departing from very simple as-
sumptions. Based on the ideas sketched by Collins in
(Collins 1995, Collins 1978) we have developed a model
that succeeded to reproduce a series of geopolitical phe-
nomena, namely the fact that most of the capitals are
located in a central position, the fact that most of the
surviving countries have cost, with only a few being in-
ternal, the possibility of stabilizing a political division
with many countries of similar size and overall shape, but
also describing the situation when the rise of an empire
is possible. Still the model needs some adaptation to be
7able to describe the sort of processes that have occurred
in The Americas and Africa, and include the possibility
of state segregation. These aspects will be taken into
account ia a future work.
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